In the winter of 1992 at a meeting in the United States, Dr. Volkan met a Greek psychoanalytic colleague whom he had not seen for some years. Both men had been interested in similar clinical topics and had, in the past, participated in professional discussions. Upon greeting this colleague, Dr. Volkan asked how life in Athens had been. The Greek quickly responded: 'We are awaiting an invasion by the Turks, but we will continue to keep them out of the EC.' Dr. Volkan, expecting the usual social response to his question, was stunned with a sudden understanding that his Greek colleague was deadly serious in his remarks. The Athenian, in this unexpected encounter with another psychoanalyst whom he knew to be of Turkish origin, gave a clue to his preoccupation with the Turks, as if experiencing a slip of the tongue. What we want to illustrate in this chapter is that the Greek psychoanalyst's remarks about the Turks are not just the reflection of one individual's personal concerns. He expressed a shared group phenomenon. It appears to us that sometimes this group phenomenon reaches almost bizarre proportions.

In this instance an expectation of invasion by the Turks is openly discussed by a Greek. The Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy, a Greek think-tank partly funded by the government, is staffed with experts who see and monitor sinister Turkish designs on Greece. In late March 1992 when the Turkish government had its hands full with PKK terrorism and the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict, Greek Foreign Minister Antomas Samaras was quick to speak of the premeditated Turkish pressures on Greece through the encirclement of his country by the Muslims in the Balkans, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonian, Kosova, Bavaria, as well as western Thrace (Greece). In a similar vein Thanos Veremis, the director of the think- tank, stated:

'Turkey plans to annex Western Thrace in the long run.' The average Greek citizen, who may not be aware of the intricacies of international law, tends to take for granted the concept, put forward by his own governmental representatives, of Turkey's expansionist desires. This fantasy of a deep-seated Turkish desire for expansion is widely held throughout the Greek government. Since Turkey's 1974 military intervention in Cyprus and the threat of force in case Greece unilaterally extends the breath of its continental shelf from six to twelve miles-which would virtually turn the Aegean Sea into a Greek lake---Greek public opinion is more and more inclined towards accepting Turkey's expansionist designs. Greece's allocation of funds for its military before the events in the former Yugoslavia is ten to eleven per cent of its total budget. This is one of the highest among all nations. The Turkish military only allocates five to seven per cent to its military despite the fact that extremely volatile and unstable Middle East and Cauicasian regions are Turkey's neighbors.

It appears that, in recent years, Greeks await, seemingly daily, a pre-emptive Turkish military attack. This is reflected in such public pronouncements as that made by Alekos Filippopoulos:

Turgut Özal wishes to make the city Istanbul a province as it was during the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, its boundaries will reach Greece.

We pursued a policy of saints against Turkey. It has failed. Let us make demands. Let us forbid hesitations on our frontiers.

The future of this homeland is apparently difficult ... If Greeks accepted abandoning lands of their forefathers without reaction, and if politicians concealed from the people the gravity of the danger ... it would mean that the bells of history were ringing for the last time ... The only way out is to elaborate a dynamic, serious national strategy. If we fail in this national task, it would be difficult to belie those who emphasize that our national existence is crumbling.

People in Greece claim that at times false alarms trigger a rush to the shops for war-time provisions, especially when tension runs high in bilateral relations. Even tourists who visit Greece are constantly reminded of the past, present, and future evil deeds of 'bad Turks'. While this shared mood in Greece is known to Turkish diplomats who work in the field of Turkish-Greek relations, the average Turk has no idea about it, and he, in turn, is not obsessed with the Greeks. The Turks' preoccupation with the Greeks remains pale in comparison to that of Greeks with the Turks.

The Media

Content analysis research commissioned by the Aegean Foundation in 1987 on reports and editorials in the Greek press on Turkey, in general, and on Turkish-Greek relations, in particular, indicated that such material appeared in the Greek press more frequently than any other topic. In Turkey, on the other hand, such material on Turkish- Greek relations ranked only sixteenth in the Turkish press.

Two years later another survey, sponsored this time by the Turkish government, had similar findings. Between 1 September and 31 December 1989 twelve major Greek newspapers with ties to various political parties were examined with respect to their contents. The nature of their contents was then compared with the news items in major Turkish newspapers published in the same time frame. This investigation demonstrated that the 'preoccupation' of the Turkish press with Greece was one-third the magnitude of that observable in the Greek press on Turkish matters. Furthermore, when the length of all the news items about Turkey in the Greek press was compared to that about Greece in the Turkish press, the Greek press devoted six times more space than did their Turkish counterparts.

Polls were also used to measure this sense of 'preoccupation'. In November 1989 PIAR and ICAP, two major public relations firms from Turkey and Greece, respectively, carried out a joint poll. They found, just as one might expect, that both sides mistrust each other, with eighty-one per cent of the Greeks and seventy-one per cent of the Turks suspicious of the other. Zatos mentions that Greeks, in general, dismiss statistics. Most likely, statistics change according to the last shared emotional event to which people respond. What is more interesting than the results of the polls, therefore, is the analysis of the content of Greek and Turkish news media, including books and newspapers.

Embodied in the Greek news media is the image of Turkey as the enemy par excellence. Turkey is described as a large, undemocratic, aggressive power disrespectful of human rights. Turkey is inclined to torture and genocide and, is now, as in the past, barbaric and uncivilized. In short, Turkey is the source of almost all the evil in the world. Greece, on the other hand, is described as totally antithetical to Turkey. The Greeks are characterized as being small, innocent, and victims who are brave and civilized Christians.

Several typical examples will convey the flavor of the Greek press' reporting on Turkey. K. Kolmer, writing in the Greek daily Mesimvrini said: 'Turkey is an economically backward, Asiatic, Moslem country which has no Western characteristics. In other words, she lacks Greco-Roman culture, Christian traditions, and is alien to democratic ideology of the West For example, the Turkish male is superior to the Turkish female. Moreover, the army plays an important role in the country's politics ... Turgut Özal has been trying to introduce a Western way of life into the country. But this goes beyond the capacity of the Turkish people.'

About a week later the headline in Kathimerini for an article by Akis Kosonas blared: 'Expansionist Recklessness of the Neighboring Country (Turkey)'. The text suggested that Greece should militarize the Aegean islands against the Turks. According to Akis Kosanas, Turks consider Greeks' good intentions as concessions. On 7 January 1991 State Minister Miltiadis Evert, in an interview given to Radio Sky, likened Muslims to snakes. As it was reported in Ta Nea, of 8 January, Miltiadis said: 'As I pointed out before on our northern frontiers, a snake is growing. It is Islam, encouraged by Pan- Turkism.' Later, on 29 April 1991, in Apoyematini Titos Athariasiadis, commenting on the scene in the Balkans, called Islam a 'viper'. He was followed on 22 May 1991 by Hristos Panayiotopoulos who wrote an arocle in the Grek weekly ENA under the title The Empire of Hallucinations', saying: 'Under the pretext of protecting the Muslim populations in the region (the Balkans) the hallucination of the Ottoman Empire is being revived. Rizospastis, on 11 March 1991 referred to a statement by Özal, in which the Turkish president had stated that Turks and Greeks had lived together for four hundred years in harmony, and commented: Turkey imagines the resurrection of the Ottoman Empire. Özal is the best representative of this Turkish "Megali Idea".'

It should also be noted that while the Turks are portrayed in the Greek press as barbaric, there is a tendency to see Turkey as 'father' (or male) and Greece as 'mother' (or female).z79 For example, on 4-5 June 1989 in the Athens News this identification process was in full view. "The Davos spirit is growing old, but it has not yet died. Mother Greece is gently taking care of it, while Father Turkey is doing all to exterminate it'.

In the above example, Father Turkey is charged with trying to kill off the Davos spirit. The Greeks usually accuse Father Turkey of raping Mother Greece echo of the perception of what Mehmet the Conqueror did in 1453 is still heard. The mental representation of the fall of Constantinople, we believe, explains certain seemingly bizarre incidents. For example, during the October 1989 World Conference of Psychiatry which was held in Athens, a high-level Turkish political figure received a postcard from two Greek women attending this conference. The postcard depicted a rape scene; on it the women wrote: 'The Greek people gave you this pleasure (of rape) in 1897, 1922, and 1974. ... We hope, however, that you will ... appreciate the eternal existence of the Greek nation and her contributions to civilization and will never again claim our land or continental shelf.' Ambassador Duntas epitomized this perspective in a comment at a conference held at the University of Dimokritos in Komotini on 14 March 1991: 'I do not say that warplanes of the Turkish Air Force violate our airspace. I say they rape it. And I use this word deliberately.'

Often the Greek press reports some fantastic commentaries on Turks or Turkey. For example, they report how Greek young men were taken off Cyprus after Turkey's intervention there in 1974 and are kept in mainland Turkey by force. These young men were married off to Turkish women. In addition, the Greek press often employs the first person plural, 'we', 'our side', etc., in talking about Greece's problems with Turkey, indicating thereby its total identification with the Greek nation and people. Furthermore, the Greek press refers to the other side as a monolithic element, 'the Turks' and 'Turkey'. Another feature of the Greek press is the fact that all elements within it take similar stands on what they call 'national themes', regardless of the political leanings of the particular paper. Moderate treatment of the Turks and any criticism of the Greek government's foreign policy may result in an accusation of high treason, which has occurred in the past. Even such a famous personality as composer and Minister without Portfolio Mikis Theodorakis has been accused of high treason for weakening Greek positions on 'national themes'. Greek journalists Lianni Kanelli and Andreas Politakis (president of the Abdi Ypekçi Prize named after the Turkish journalist who promoted Turco-Greek friendship but who was assassinated in the mid-1970s for his liberal views) have been accused by the Greek press of high treason for treating the Turks with moderation. Journalistic criticism of the Greek government, therefore, is largely confined to such areas as the government's lack of toughness and determination with respect to Turkey, the relative absence of a long-term strategy, and the need to shore up national unity. The press constantly calls for a more energetic response to Turkey, more active efforts to influence the West in adopting a more pro-Greek stance, and the development of a more resolute and long-term strategy.

Similar events are observed in Cyprus. In November, 1992, around the time when the Cypriot Turkish and Greek leaders were involved in intense discussion at the United Nations on the future of the island as an independent entity, a huge uproar occurred in the Cypriot Greek press. The fuss was about the opening ceremony of the University of Cyprus in the Greek sector. A vitriolic attack against Nelly Tsouyiopoulos, the chairperson of the University Interim Governing Committee, was launched in the Greek press, especially the right-wing papers, because she had ignored the presence of the Greek Education undersecretary at the ceremony and had not provided proper seating for several important Greek academic representatives. Furthermore, the Greek Archbishop had not been asked to bless the university campus. Nelly Tsouyiopoulos was 'burned at the stake' for failing to protect Hellenism and Greece-Christian ideals.

In reality, this university had been envisaged as an academic institution. But someone discovered a book in the Turkish Studies Department which includes two maps depicting a 'divided' Cyprus. Apparently, the book was used in Germany to teach Turkish students about their roots, and the maps were intended to show the students that part of Cyprus is Turkish. However, to find this book in a Cypriot Greek academic institution was enough, along with the actions of Nelly Tsouyiopoulos at the opening ceremony, to preoccupy the Cypriot Greek press for many days.

Another feature of Greece's attitude towards Turkey is apparent in her constant monitoring of Western public opinion, making it seem as though Greece acts in ways calculated to gain Western approval. While it is common for countries to do this at moments of concentrated international media coverage, Turkey complains that Greece is extreme in the manner in which her public actions are committed to currying favour in the West In addition, with respect to their bilateral relations with Turkey, the Greeks always seek to portray themselves as the injured party who is always in the might. This attitude was summed up in a Statement in Ethnos (31 May 1991): 'It is a wonderful feeling always to be right. But it is more important to make one's rightness acknowledged by others.'

Obviously, the Greek public constitutes a great market for this sort of yellow, or more aptly, blue and white journalism. The Turkish public, on the other hand, is mostly indifferent to this situation as they are mostly uninformed about every trivial, insignificant development in Turkish-Greek relations. The Turkish press tends to concentrate on the news of current popular interest Turkish-Greek relations, for the most part, are not high on the popularity chart. However, this does not hold true for the Cypriot Turkish press. In Cyprus there are daily reports on political processes dealing with the conflict. Turks publish the summaries of the Greek editorials and news, and the Greeks do the same with the Turkish press. Living on the same island, each side can watch both Turkish and Greek television. On Cyprus there is an active propaganda war.

Diplomatic Contacts

Two high-level Turkish diplomats who have been closely involved in dealing with present Turkish-Greek disputes and in their analysis, told us independently how the Greeks unanimously praise Turkish diplomacy and the long-term planning embodied in Turkish foreign policy. Greeks consider the conduct of Turkish foreign policy, based on a well-defined and immutable strategy, to be among the best in the world. One of these diplomats told us that whenever he travels to Greece to attend a multinational meeting he 'always feels as though the Greeks treated (him) as if (he) was the most important person there. [He] was given precedence over the diplomats from other countries'.

A closer look at this phenomenon, however, suggests that there may be a correlation between the Greeks' praise of Turkish diplomacy and their obsession with 'the Greek Destiny', that is, the acceptance by Greeks of suffering as being an inheritance from all of their past 'chosen traumas' in history and, therefore, an inseparable part of life. In turn, this may have created' the innate magnanimity and kindness in the Greek soul'. In this case, if Turkish diplomacy is stable and good, the Turks will continue a policy of victimizing the Greeks. Just as Dr. Volkan's Greek psychoanalytic colleague expressed it, there does exist the feared expectation of a Turkish 'invasion'. The diplomats who spoke with us also describe how statements of Turkish politicians are carefully studied by the Greeks at all times, and all actions and reactions of Turkey are almost invariably denounced by Greece as provocation's. One of the diplomats added: 'We cannot make any innocent remarks or even peaceful overtures without the Greeks finding some sort of overt aggression or provocation in them.' Under these conditions, the Turks believe that it is very difficult, in fact, impossible to have effective negotiations with the Greeks.

It seems to us that such highly emotionally-charged Greek public opinion on 'national themes' makes it extremely difficult for Greek politicians to move away from such emotional attitudes and the shared mood in the country. At the same time, the Greek politician is involved in politics that mobilizes people around him and around the same 'national themes'. This is not only true of their relations with Turkey but with other neighbors as well. Greece set as a precondition for recognition of Macedonian that the republic change its name. The entire Greek political class and people supported this unheard of demand to the consternation of Greece's friends and allies. In the light of such obtuse political behavior, a former Greek deputy minister's suggestion in 1988 that an institute be established for the study of Turkey, since many Greeks feel it is impossible to understand the Turks, appears to miss the point. In fact, the number of existing institutes for Turkish studies in Greece is impressive, whereas, there is not a single institute in Turkey for Greek studies.

Contacts Among Citizens

While our focus has been on group phenomena and obsessions, we should note that when Turks and Greeks get together as individuals they find a great deal to share, such as food and music, so that the path to becoming good friends is facilitated. When a Turk and a Greek get to know each other on a personal level, usually in a 'neutral' country, they may notice that the 'other' is not a suitable target for their projections. Thus, they may focus on their similarities and become friends. Group psychology is different from individual psychology. When large groups interact, the 'reality testing' of the members about their projections and other shared mental mechanisms becomes blurred.

In discussing their lives in Greece, many Turks who have lived in Greece for long periods of time note that Greek citizens try to avoid discussing Greek-Turkish matters with Turks in both public and private. One may explain it away as prudence on the Greeks' part in order to avoid unnecessary quarrels. Those Turks whom we interviewed had the impression, however, that the Greeks did not want to find out directly what the Turks thought of Greek-Turkish problems. We believe that this is due to the group pressure on Greeks to keep the Turks as suitable reservoirs for projections. Friendships become more comfortable with the utilization of avoidance. As indicated earlier, the Greek press does not properly reflect Turkish views either. As a result of a lack of sufficient contact between both people and ideas, Greeks come to believe in what they themselves say. Their arguments gradually become severed from the Turkish reality while at the same time becoming intensified emotionally.

Often, casual meetings between Turks and Greeks have been affected by political obstacles. The Turkish government in 1984 took unilateral action against this by lifting visa restrictions on Greeks. Since then, however, some influential circles among Greek public opinion makers have been trying vigorously to restrict the number of Greek tourists traveling to Turkey. They accuse 'Turkey-goers' of spending scarce hard currency in an enemy country thereby contributing to its potential war effort. They are portrayed as harming their own country for the sake of some inexpensive leather goods or other similar items. When Turkey eased visa restrictions, the Greek government responded to these efforts by reducing the work hours of customs officials at some border points and tried to impose a tax on those Greeks who traveled to Turkey more than once or twice a year. Tourists from both sides of the border, however, continued to cross over. But then a tragic event occurred that once more inflamed emotions.

In 1991 a tourist bus was set on fire in Istanbul tragically killing twenty-five Greeks. This event was sufficient to 'concretize' in the Greek mind the savagery they expected from the Turks. The daily newspaper Rizospastis referred to the event as a 'genocide'. Upon investigation, it turned out that the criminal, who also died in the fire, was a mentally ill Turk who had been released from a mental hospital the day before. At a certain level, however, we think that this man might have 'acted out' the hostile tensions between the two ethnic groups.

'Other-directed' Cultures

In this chapter we have sought to illustrate the general mood of the public and officials in Greece reflective of the Turkish-Greek relationship. Turkish and Greek scholars, as well as investigators from other cultures, have consistently shown that the Turks and the Greeks belong to 'other-directed' cultures: each feels that something out there (for example, an 'out group') continues to frustrate them in spite of constant efforts to strengthen the 'in group' system.

In the Turkish-Greek conflict, Greece is the smaller and weaker party; Greece has a population of ten million, while over fifty-eight million people live in Turkey. Although Greece expanded in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, in 1922 she lost the war with the Turks in the western portion of Asia Minor. This is considered a tragedy in Greece, while for the Turks, the victory led to the foundation of modem Turkey. Moreover, in 1974 Greece remained a passive spectator as Turkish forces intervened militarily in northern Cyprus. It has been our observation that in conflicts between ethnic or national groups, the party which perceives itself as the loser or the victim becomes more obsessed with the opposing party than the opposing party does with the 'loser'.

The Greeks are involved in what Volkan calls 'pre-war rituals' in that seminal dehumanization of the opposite side can be prominently seen.zs4 Thus, they call the 'other' snakes or other non-human, degrading terms. This act of dehumanization is usually projected backwards in historic time as well, as is evident in even such a scholarly work as Speros Vyronis' The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through Fifteenth Century, in which the vocabulary used to describe activity by the Turks consists of terms usually associated with animals and insects. This type of relationship is dominated by excessive polarized images, excessive projections and displacements, and a need to respond in a regressive fashion. These psychological mechanisms are, accordingly, geared more towards fantasy than reality while having more aggressively loaded aims than peaceful objectives.