Turkey and Greece have a crucial advantage in keeping peace between them when their situation is compared to the situations of many other states in regional conflicts. This advantage comes from their membership of the same alliance, NATO, but also from their traditional relationships. While this relationship is contaminated with intense psychological processes, its long history provides certain familiarity and caution. Since 1930, Turks and Greeks negotiated and concluded various documents, such as treaties, agreements, conventions, joint communiqués, and so on. They have, at least, prevented wars, with the exception of the brief 1974 war on Cyprus which could be considered as a 'displaced war'. It was not a major war between Turkey and Greece; blood was shed on a location which, through the psychological mechanism of displacement, was the focus of a clash between the 'stand-in' parties, while the 'mother' countries remained outside a direct ached struggle.

The Turkish-Greek traditional relationship, however, does not allow a durable settlement between Turkey and Greece. Considering how, throughout world history, important conflicts of sovereignty generally result in war, the maintenance of peace between Turkey and Greece is no meager success. Presently, drastic events in the surrounding areas-in the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and Turkey's attempt to emerge as a regional power are constantly influencing the Turkish-Greek relationship. The potential danger of a worsening Turkish-Greek relations exists. It is, therefore, important that this conflict is studied in such a way that areas not illuminated by the traditional approaches of diplomacy, history, and political science can be examined.

Alongside the traditional and Realpolitik considerations in international relationships, there are always obligatory psychological-often unconscious-issues that are, in effect, tainted with irrationality. Economic, political, historical, and military events can, at times, become so psychologized and so 'stubbornly fixed' in the minds of the participants that without an understanding of the large group psychology that contaminates them, it might be impossible to establish newly chandelled approaches towards finding solutions. All these factors have contributed to our underlying assumption that large group interactions involve processes, not just spontaneous 'magical' solutions. A more durable settlement between the Turks and the Greeks might not be achieved by 'logical' traditional approaches alone. Their relationship should be looked at through 'a psychological lens' and findings from such a study should be 'aired out', i.e., discussed at conferences and included in art forms, such as novels and the cinema. In short, multiple meanings of events pertaining to both paråes should be brought to Turkish and Greek mass consciousness. It is with such a belief that we undertook writing this book.

Throughout this book, while attempting to provide the historical flow of the Turkish-Greek relationship in a condensed forth, our focus has been on the illumination of three factors: (1) chosen traumas and glories, (2) leader-follower interactions, and (3) identity problems. While we may be criticized for leaving out many historical events and references to important leaders, we would obviously need more than one volume to cover the details. We have chosen to discuss events and leaders who, in our estimation, have shaped the identities of both sides and their perceptions of the 'other.

The Greek Identity

Western European nation-states have been products of long internal and international wars which raise national consciousness and bring about emotionally-invested frontiers. The Church and the Inquisition have helped create homogenized cultures by eradicating heresies. Economic development engineered by the bourgeoisie provided a strong network between classes, urban and rural populations, and regions. The Renaissance and the Enlightenment decisively contributed to the transition from feudal to nation-states in that this nationalist movement contained and reduced the power, status, and influence of the church and religion in society. Most western European countries created national churches especially as a result of the Reformation. It took revolutions to establish human rights and freedoms by restricting the absolute power of monarchies.

Before the Western European nation-states came into being, the fatherland, the state structure, and the nation had already been created in a long evolutionary process. In contrast, in the Christian areas of the Ottoman Empire, the development of nationalism and the creation of nation- states took a different turn. At the moment of independence, the Balkan Christians belonged to the ecumenical Orthodox Church, which had political and judicial powers over the people transcending cultural and ethnic differences between the Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Slavs, Romanians, and so on. These peoples lived intermingled in territories which were not ethically well-defined and which had no state structures. Those Christian nation-states which were born out of the Ottoman Empire had to fight (1) for independence against a declaring imperial country, (2) for redeeming the members of its ethnic groups in the remaining territories of the Empire and in other countries (called irredentism) and (3) for creating a culturally homogeneous people. Certainly, modern Greece was involved in all three steps. Greece's movement in creating a national identity, however, more than the other nation-states which were established in the former Ottoman territories, had another element. The European countries, especially the British, the French, and the Russians, joined hands in 'demanding' and sponsoring the kind of identity modern Greece should have; it should be Hellenic. After their War of Independence, modern Greeks, in fact, embraced Hellenism. After forty years, when the Megali Idea became crystallized, they began to incorporate into their Hellenic identity their identity as the heirs of the Byzantine Empire. The modem Greek identity remains as the synthesis of these two elements and includes various chosen glories and chosen traumas.

Hellenism, as a national ideology, initially and essentially was externally-directed. At the time of the Greek War of Independence, this ideology was unrelated to the existing culture of Greece. As they quickly embraced Hellenism, they made it 'intimately pemsonal' and began to identify it in a mystical way that they felt could not be understood even by their Western sponsors. George Evlambios in 1843 stated that foreigners should not attempt the impossible by trying to understand the mysteries of Greekness. Evlambios observed:

I do not know whether a foreigner can ever assimilate the spirit (pnevma) of another people (laos) to the point of daring to correct and alter the people's creations, especially when Greeks themselves - born and bred in their fatherland, and in contact from childhood on with their customs and language - do not give themselves such a right.2ss It is ironic that the Hellenist thesis, although externally directed, should in practice cause the Greeks to be-psychologically speaking-'self centered' and obsessively differentiated from 'others'. Because Hellenism was an imported ideology and as such facilitated an alien encroachment on highly personal matters of the self and identity, the Greeks, paradoxically, did their best to prevent foreign involvement and preserve their independence in a xenophobic manner.

The embracing Hellenism could be crystallized by developing cultural links to the past. Greek scholars, as well as artists, provided the necessary links in finding a 'continuity' of people living in a span of twenty-five centuries. But the maintenance of Hellenism needed an unconscious group activity: wholesale projection of the old and unwanted Romeic identity which was perceived as oriental, therefore inferior, by the West. The Turks provided a suitable reservoir for the Greeks' massive projections. The Turks remained 'uncivilized', while the Greeks became 'civilized'. Due to the long history of their 'togetherness' and 'cross-identifications', the Greeks had to get rid of the Turk within themselves. No one explains this better than the great Greek writer, Nikos Kazantzakis, in his Report to Greece. In this book he describes his childhood memories in Crete and states:

To gain freedom first of all from the Turk, that was the initial step, after that, later, this new struggle began: to gain freedom from the inner Turk from ignorance, malice and envy, from fear and laziness, from dazzling false ideas, and finally from idols, all of them, even the most revered and beloved ... Overflowing the bounds of Crete and Greece, it (the struggle) raged in all eras and locales and invaded the history of mankind. Battling now were not Crete and Turkey but good and evil, light and darkness, God and the devil. It was always the same battle, the eternal one, and standing always behind the good, behind the light and God, was Crete; behind evil, behind darkness, and the devil, Turkey.

This massive projection caused Turkokratia, the Greeks' common history with the Ottoman Turks, to be remembered in a stereotyped way. Our reading of the writings by Greek historians suggested to us that their work was intended to take revenge as much as document history. Turkokratia was transformed into a colossal chosen trauma. As the Turks were blamed for any negative perception of the Greeks by the West, it has become difficult for the Greeks to take responsibility for their shortcomings. The projection by a group of its unwanted parts on to some suitable target in order to bolster its own identity is only part of the psychological reaction; there is no guarantee in any case that such projection will continue and not boomerang. There is a need for shared mental activity to secure the stability of mass projections. Therefore, the Greeks continue to be obsessed with the Turks, and as they speak of having been victimized by them, they believe as a group that such victimization will be repeated. The expansionist, irredentism, and aggressive aim of the new Greek state is projected on to the Turks. Thus, the Greeks see Turkey as being governed by its army, and regard negotiation and dialogue with Turkish diplomats as futile-involvement with a powerless wing of the Turkish government.

Greek irredentism started with acceptance by modem Greeks of the Hellenistic thesis. While Hellenism provided a new sense of shared self esteem and pride, it created a problem: the uncertainty regarding the frontiers of the new state. The ambiguity inherent in Hellenism as a nationa1 ideology based on the remotely past data of culture, language, and political configurations was not conducive to the determination of the borders. Moreover, since the Greek Kingdom continued expanding at the cost of the Ottoman Empire, it was politically impossible to set final territorial goals. The ambiguity about borders, we believe, created identity problems and became the fuel for irredentism. Modem Greeks tried to fill the vacuum created by denial of their Romeic identity and by incorporating 'Hellenic territories' and Greek-speaking individuals into the new Greek Kingdom.

As the Hellenic thesis was assimilated, the Greeks went through a process of purification. For example, they cleaned Turkish words and many words of Romeic origin from their language. They went back to the Hellenic source to form a language which was called katherevousa. Hellenism is the regeneration of a two and a half millennia old ancient history. Hence, it is greatly dependent on historical memory created by deliberate efforts. This attitude toward history and nation building is not conducive to forgetting the chosen traumas and painful events in recent history. Therefore, the Greeks live in the past as much as in the present and consider the Turks as the ones who always fisted their legitimate historical rights. The Turks were qualified as aggressive and expansionist even when they defended the regions they had inhabited for four to five centuries as the majority, for the Turks were not entitled to these lands from the Hellenic standpoint of history. In other words, aggressively and expansionism were, and even now are, attributed to or projected onto the Turks on the grounds that according to Hellenism their holdings are illegitimate. Greek irredentism is rendered totally innocent in this context. Greeks seem to shy away from establishing a link between Greek irredentism and the concept of expansionism, and only feel the pain of deprivation of what is 'rightfully' their own.

After living with Hellenism for about forty yearns begging with the Greek War of Independence, the cultural heritage of Byzantium, especially with the words of Spyridon Zambelios and Nikolas G. Politis, slowly entered into the Greek national identity intellectually. It would become an appendix to the fundamentally Hellenic individual and group identity. With this development, further projection of the unwanted aspects of the Romeic identity on the Turks occurred. When the Byzantine culture condensed with the Hellenistic, starting around the 1860s, irredentism and the Megali Idea became inseparable. The Greeks, as a group, psychologically reached back to the fall of Constantinople as their prime chosen trauma. Every suffering since then was condensed with the event of 1453 and its mental representation. The inability to mourn the collapse of the Byzantine empire is expressed as a political ideology, found in the Megali Idea. It affects the Greeks' intentional relationships, especially their relationship with Turkey.

The seizure of Constantinople by the youthful and virile Turkish sultan after he opened a hole in the city wall was perceived as a rape, and Turks were considered lustful. The city, which was later named Istanbul, became over time the symbol of a fallen or grieving woman and was so celebrated in folk-songs and poems throughout many centuries. The seeds of the Megali Idea came soon after this Turkish conquest Its ideology calls for the reverse of Eartha Kitt's song and has it 'Constantinople, not Istanbul'. Even today, whenever there are political problems between Turkey and Greece, the Greek press, as well as politicians and military men, often refer to the Turks as 'rapists'.

It proved impossible to fully realize the irredentism aspirations provoked by Hellenism and the Megali Idea; thus, Greek nationalism has remained unconsummated, unfinished, and unsuccessful despite its remarkable achievements. The Greeks always seem to gauge their success, not by what they gain, but by the perceived gap between their wished for objectives and reality. Since it is impossible in today's world to reach the 'ultimate borders' of Hellenism, the Greeks appear doomed to have a continuing sense of frustration regarding the present borders of Greece. The fact that the status of air space, territorial waters, and the continental shelf are disputed between Greece and Turkey exacerbate this feeling of frustration. The high number of events to mourn in Greece indicates a more likely preoccupation with chosen traumas than a preoccupation with chosen glories. Repeating mourning ceremonies suggest that attempts at mourning have been ritualized. The group's sense of being victimized prevails and this, paradoxically, supports the group's self idealization and/or hopes for idealization. Being victimized also strengthens irredentism aspirations, keeps alive the Megali Idea and contributes to frustrations.

No clearly recognizable father figure appeared during the Greek War of Independence, although a charismatic leader (as defined by Max Weber) is essential in a time of crisis when a group is modifying or reforming its identity.z93 He confers legitimacy on a move from one shared belief system to another. Although there were Greek heroes during the War even such foreign ones as Byron no long lasting charismatic leadership emerged, though President Ionnes Kapodistirias, who tried to consolidate reforms, was considered such a leader by some. Kapodistirias had been a close adviser to Tsar Alexander I, even acting as a joint Russian Foreign Minister along with Count Nesselrode. The Society of Friends (Philike Hetaria) sought to make him their head, but he refused. After falling out with Alexander he spent some time in Switzerland, and then in 1827 he was elected to a seven-year term as president of Greece. His attempts to turn Greece into a democratic, centralized state won the hostility of almost all groups in Greece; he became a hated man. The powers tried to oust him without success. Eventually he was assassinated by the Mavro Michili family, who were important landowners in the Morea.

The Greek War of Independence obviously cannot be reduced to the activities of the Klephts, but there is no denying the fact that the Klephts play an implant pan in this struggle. However, their role most likely had an adverse effect on the state structure. The Klephts had never really known a central government that was not foreign, physically and psychologically distant, and usually hostile. Koliopoulos states: "The state of control and manipulated lawlessness demoralized and sapped the strength of the emerging new society. In the long run, that state of affairs did exercise a pernicious influence on both popular attitudes toward the emerging State and the actual functioning of that State.'z94 This is called palikarism in Greek politics. Indeed, in many respects Klephtic-style warfare survived up to the present; for example, during the Civil War of 1943-1949 they were self proclaimed 'kings of the mountain' who were clearly more interested in plunder than in national or ideological straggles. Many of these men, such as Bellis, Tzavelas, and Karalivanos, later became resistance heroes. There was still another hero who was called Aris, whose real name was Thanasis Klaras. The role played by EOKA in the Greek Cypriotic struggle for Enosis can also be considered as the continuation of this style of warfare.

The story of Klephts and the possibility of their identification of the concept of the state with the sultan may explain partly the hostile and ambivalent attitude of Greeks toward the state, but this attitude may have a different cause: the absence of a charismatic leader during and after the War of Independence. At the time of the formation of the new Greek nation-state, the Turkish sultan was still the 'bad father', and since the Greeks had no acknowledged and long-lasting 'good father' they could not establish balance between 'good' and 'bad' and tame their perception of the sultan and his Turkish followers. Here we are not referring to the reality of the sultan and his government being the enemy and their actual wrongdoing. Rather, we are considering the Greeks' shared psychic reality about the Ottoman leader. In the long run, the psychic reality which is transmitted from generation to generation is more influential than the external realities in shaping a group's behavior. We think that the unavailability of a charismatic hero at the time when the new Greek identity was established made it difficult for the Greeks to identify with each other and, in turn, with the leader and his or her aspirations for the group. This situation most likely impeded the reconciliation of the Greek people with their own State which adversely affected their attitude towards political order, morals, and ethics in both domestic and international relations.

Thus, it could be possible that the need for mass projections of unwanted parts onto other groups, especially on the Turks, remained most active in order to maintain cohesiveness of the Greek identity.

Hellenism and the Megali Idea underwent two catastrophes in this century. The first one occurred in Asia Minor in 1922, and the second one in Cyprus in 1974. In the first instance, the Greeks lost a war; in the second, they avoided a war (between Greece and Turkey proper). Markides suggests that the Megali Idea has an 'internal logic' and reinforces the moral foundations upon which traditional institutions, and we can add political institutions, are built Hellenism and the Megali Idea create such a shared emotional attitude and conviction that the Greeks feel entitled to the whole of Cyprus, the air space above the Aegean Sea, the continental shelf, and proprietary rights concerning the use of the word 'Macedonia'. The Megali Idea and the idealization of Hellenism, on the one hand, and the psychology of the remaining victims, on the other, are the 'unseen' powers which are imbued in modem Greek group identity, and they complicate political negotiations, create psychological resistances to solutions, and make negotiations with the Turks difficul

Greek accession to the European Community (EC) membership triggered another mass projection onto Turkey. This time Greece was becoming a truly European country; therefore, she needed to rid herself of all the non-European relics in her shared group identity. In the 1967-1974 Junta Era, Greece's international prestige was at its lowest ebb. The coup engineered by the Greek Junta in Cyprus prompted the Turkish military intervention which, in turn, led to the overthrow of the Junta and the return of democracy in Greece. Greeks then wished to forget the painful recent past. In 1981 when Greece was joining the EC, there was another Junta in power-this time in Turkey. Time was ripe to exploit the situation for foreign policy purposes, but there seemed to be also a psychological mechanism at work. Identifying their Junta with that of the Turks', the Greeks projected the ill feelings related to the repressive Greek military rule onto the Turks.

In 1975 the communists, who had been outlawed and outcast after the civil war, were incorporated into Greek political life. This helped to soften the domestic political polarization in Greece and resulted in withdrawing the old projections from the communists. The withdrawn projections laden with painful memories of the civil war, in turn, reinforced the new projections on to the Turks increasing their negative, brutal, oppressive, undemocratic image. The fact that Papandreou and his socialist party, PASOK, which have suffered most from the Junta, were in power enhanced the density and the scope of this projection.

Upon returning to democracy in 1984, Turkey tried to normalize its relations with the EC and eventually made its application for full membership in 1987. Greece perceived these attempts as against its foreign policy interests. In opposing the development of Turkey's relation with the EC, Greeks emphasized, perhaps more than other Europeans, the non-European character of Turks while highlighting their Muslim religion and 'fundamentalist' tendencies.

The Turkish Identity

Efforts at serious reform in political, cultural, and social areas within the Ottoman Empire go back to the last quarter of the eighteenth century. One crucial landmark of these efforts was the abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826 and attempts at the Turkification of the military at more or less the same time. During the 'longest century' of the Ottoman Empire, the nineteenth century, issues of cultural/social identity were approached in three different ways:

1. To enlarge the Ottoman identity in all its citizens, regardless of their ethnic or religious adherence. This was unsuccessful since investment in ethnicity or nationalism increased in Europe, and within the Ottoman Empire, after the French Revolution.
2. To put all Muslims in the empire under the umbrella of Pan-Islamism. Ethnic differences among Muslims precluded the success of Pan-Islam.
3. To focus on expansion of the Turkish identity. Under this umbrella, Turks, and those who felt as Turks, would be combined. Since there were Turks and their adherents throughout Asia and Europe, the Turkish identity might be expected to have created a mighty political and cultural force.

All three options had one aim in commence-to keep the sultan in place and in power. The drastic change involved in establishing a Turkish identity apart from the sultan and Ottoman traditions had to await the end of World War I and the Turkish War of Independence. During this time, Turks had to fight major Christian powers as well as Greeks and the Muslim Arabs in the Middle East. The environment was ready for a cohesive Turkish nation, and this came about under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk).

The modern Turkish identity has seen seventy years of history, revolution, and modification. Atatürk's nationalist policies were predicated upon the concept of the National Pact, the Misak-i milli, first enunciated by the Sivas Congress of 1919 and then promulgated by the Ottoman Parliament under the domination of Mustafa Kemal's followers in January 1920. The National Pact in effect stipulated that all the territories of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by a majority of Muslim Turks formed an indivisible whole.

Upon the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the victory of Mustafa Kemal and his nationalists, Turkey was substituted for the Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne recognized the principles of the National Pact the sovereignty and indivisibility of the Turkish nation, and the determination by plebiscites of the political future of certain areas of the former empire. In other words, the modem state of Turkey would harbour no irredentism aspirations with respect to former territories of the Ottoman Empire, nor towards territories outside the empire inhabited by Turks, such as Central Asia, with the exception of the Hatay (Alexandretta) which was incorporated into Turkey by means of a plebiscite in 1938. The National Pact basically corresponds to the de facto borders of the Ottoman Empire at the time of the Mudros Armistice, which ended the hostilities of World War I. Therefore, its realization did not necessitate the resumption of war against the victors of World War I. It marked the end of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. The Turks who remained outside these borders did not constitute large groups; hence, the liberation of 'unredeemed brethren' was not a cause for concern

The Ottoman Empire had broken up due to the question of nationalities. The unequivocal character of the new borders was essential to eliminate future wars and to concentrate on the socioeconomic and political development of the new Turkey. As a result, the National Pact clearly defined the borders of new Turkey according to which the nationalist forces, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, waged a war of independence. Irredentism and the National Pact were incompatible. Accordingly, the National Pact did not raise the problems that Hellenism had done in Greece. On the contrary, it contributed greatly to the new Turkish identity by distinctly shaping its outer borders.

Although more than ninety-five per cent of the citizens of the Turkish Republic are Muslims, their cohesion is based not on their religion but on their citizenship. This is one of the reasons why the ethnic Kurds, who played an important role in Atatürk's victories during the Turkish War of Independence, were put under the Turkish umbrella. Internal homogeneity was of utmost importance to the Turks. A large part of the population of the new state consisted of those who had been forced out of their centuries old Balkan lands through numerous ethnic purification or cleansing operations similar to those seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. The forced exchange of population between Turkey and Greece as envisaged by the Lausanne Treaty left a fairly homogeneous population in the country.

The new Turkish nation was not to be a continuation of Ottomanism; secularism sharply differentiated the Turkish Republic from the Ottoman Empire. During World War I and the Turkish War of Independence, the Turks fought mainly against Europeans. Paradoxically, however, under Atatürk's tutelage, Turkey became engaged in a vigorous process of westernization, and the West was, thus, both 'an enemy' and 'an ideal object'. Large groups in the process of developing a new mass consciousness usually adopt a 'purification policy'. This may include wholesale projection of the group's unwanted parts, and its attempt to cleanse itself from elements contaminated with them.

The Greeks won their independence one hundred years before the Turkish War of Independence and had massively projected, as we noted in the previous section of this chapter, their Romeic/Oriental identity onto the Turks as they evolved in their new Hellenic/Byzantine one. Modern Turkish nationalism evolved without massive projections onto the West. The new leaders of Turkey would not allow the enemy, the West, to become a suitable target for projection since the West was also idealized. Instead, in the initial phase of modern Turkey, Turks underwent a process of differentiating themselves fur from the rest of the Islamic world, declaring themselves secular and closer to Western ideals and way of life. They used other Muslims, notably the Ottomans and the Arabs, rather than Europeans as a reservoir for projections of their unwanted parts. This, of course, caused problems since it disturbed the continuity from past to present

The modern Turk relates to aspects of his past with a certain ambivalence. The westernized revolutionary elite of the new republic called themselves 'enlightened ones' and separated themselves from the traditional and conservative segments of the population This led to a politically and culturally polarized society. The elite considered Islamic fanaticism as the main cause of the demise of the empire, whereas the conservatives accused the 'enlightened ones' of imitating the West at the expense of the real identity of the people. The ensuing 'identity crisis' took the form of a left-right dichotomy after 1960. This dichotomy, however, gradually lost its impact as a result of democracy. Nevertheless, the recent upsurge of Orthodox Islam among the newly urbanized population is the extension of this problem. The problem of Turkey's 'identity crisis', however, has nothing to do with Turkish-Greek relationships. The Turks' purification process, which was relatively harmless and included no malignant devaluation of others, mainly concerned the elimination of the Arabic and Persian influences in their language; they Turkified' many European words, and adopted the Latin alphabet. This, and other measures, such as accepting European criminal and civil laws and changing the dress code, further separated modem Turks from their Ottoman past and from other Islamic countries that continued using Arabic script and Islamic law.

The Turks' view of the Greeks describes their dilemma of having an enemy who is both devalued and idealized. Herkül Millas researched stories, novels, and plays written between 1909 and 1956 by the famous Turkish writer Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu in order to understand the image of the Greek in Turkish literature. The selection of Karaosmanoglu is a good one. Not only was he an important literary figure but also a politician and a personal friend of both Atatiirk and his successor, Inönü. Karaosmanoglu's writings include references to the Greek invasion of Anatolia and he speaks of irresponsible and murderous Greek soldiers who terrorized the citizenry and dishonored women. Karaosmanoglu characterizes the Greek army as an unworthy opponent, the Greek men as greedy and ungrateful and the Greek women as flirtatious. Meanwhile, Karaosmanoglu is very comfortable in comparing Atatürk to ancient Greek gods and Atatürk's dining room to a gathering of Socrates. Unlike Europeans, the Turks, due to their long 'togetherness' with the Greeks, never experienced the present day Greeks as a continuation of the ancient ones.

Contrary to the Greek War of Independence, the Turks fought their war under the indisputable leadership of Mustafa Kemal, an Ottoman general. Apart from the benefits of a charismatic leadership in the transition from Empire to nation-state, the War of Independence was waged by a regular army under his command. The extremely limited use of irregular forces in this war did not lead afterwards to the lawlessness which had afflicted the new Greek state and political life. The Ottoman state structure was transferred almost automatically to the republic. Turkey has never faced the problem of state-building experienced by the late-comer Balkan countries to the nation-state era. Reconciliation of the state with the nation has never been a problem for Turkey. All in all, the Turkish revolution largely resembled Western European examples, mentioned earlier, in that the revolution aimed at removing the monarchy and restricting the scope of religion.

There was a psychological price to be paid for all Atatürk's innovations and his cultural revolution. Their idealization of Atatürk and his perception of modern Turkey kept the Turks from grieving over the loss of their Empire and brought about distancing from selective aspects of their past. The inevitable psychological need to integrate the past with the present would assert itself later, with all its attendant psychological and real-world struggles. At the same time, the victorious West, which found itself unable to impose its will on Turkey at the conclusion of World War I, was still saddled with the centuries-old stereotypes of the Turk.

Just before Atatürk's death, many Jewish scholars and artists escaping from the Nazis went to Turkey. Most of them eventually went to other richer countries, such as the United States, but they contributed substantially to Turkey's westernization. For example, many German Jewish physicians taught in Turkish medical schools; German Jewish artists were central in the development of the Turkish opera and ballet

When Atatürk died in 1938, his friend, Ysmet (Inönü) succeeded him. We believe that Ismet Inönü was a more thoroughly Western man in the European sense than Atatürk. Turkish educators began translating the Western classics as well as ancient Greek writings in a wholesale way, making them available in the schools at every level. Western culture and values came 'from the top'. Since Atatürk was 'the Etemal Leader' and, accordingly, 'alive', with his charisma still influential in educated circles as well as in public circles in general, Ynönü's government found little opposition to the westernization, but unconscious resistance obviously remained among some.

Hottingsr describes how Atatürk opened a wedge-shaped path through the thick forest of Turkish politics. During his time, and Inönü"s, the end of the wedge 'was so wide that it seemed at first to be clearing the whole of the thicket. In the course of the decades that followed [Atatürk's] death, the broad path narrowed and trees and undergrowth grew tall on both sides'. We agree with Hottinger, however, that the general direction of the path remains, and the Turks can yet advance along it.

Initially, Atatürk's own lonely but grand self was reflected in the new Turkishness. Inönü, having kept his country out of World War II, caused its further isolation and an illusion of greatness that fostered the denial of past losses and present realities. As the influence of the Atatürk-Ynönü era weakened, Turks began to see their reality more clearly. However, it was still hard for them to mourn Atatürk, as it was difficult for them to mourn the Empire.

Meanwhile, the world did not stand still (Chapter 15), and external events began to challenge the new Turkishness and the grand loneliness at its core. After the Atatürk and Ynönü eras, modern Turkey went through turbulent times due to internal opposing politics and ideologies, and searched for a newer identity. We suspect that attempts at mourning over the lost past identity and adjustment to the real world were among the causes of this turmoil. The exodus of millions of Turkish 'guest workers' to Europe challenged Turkey's self contained existence. The Turkish reaction to Cyprus challenged emotionally, if not legally, the foundation of Misak-i Milli (Te National Pact). Turks stressed their legal rights in 'the partition' of Cyprus that assigned Greeks to the south and Turks to the north. In spite of these events, the 'loneliness' lingered on. In 1975, Niyazi Berkes stated:

Today's Turkey is neither a western nor a Moslem nation; it does not belong to a Christian, socialist, or capitalist community. It is neither Asian nor European.

Berkes spoke about the 'loneliness' of Turkey in respect to its economy, politics, and culture. We believe that to some extent, two decades after Berkes described Turkey, some of the characteristics he attached to Turkey still remain. But Turkey has made great advances to turn this 'loneliness' into a 'uniqueness', as we shall see. Further events in the world forced the Turks to free themselves from some of the outdated original principles of Kemalism. Modification in economic principles and the encouragement of the private sector have tied Turkey more closely to the rest of the world. As mourning over the loss of Atatürk takes place, there has been more investment in the chosen glories and the chosen traumas of the Ottoman period. The external influence most telling in the modification of the present sense of Turkish's, however, is the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the Turkic Republics in Central Asia and Azerbaijan in the Caucusus, the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the burning of the Turks in Germany, and the activities of the PKK (Kurdistan Ysçi Pamtisi-Kurdish Workers Paity). The Kurdish issue called attention to such questions as: Who is a Turk? Who feels like a Turk? Presently, the Turkish news media is full of polls concerning these issues. Turkey, for some time now, has expressed an interest in becoming a full member of the European Community, and this brings the Greeks and other Europeans once more to the question: Istanbul or Constantinople? There seems to be no desire thus far on the part of Christian Europeans to have the Turks join their club. In fact, they are saying: 'As long as Constantinople is Istanbul, you don't belong to our kind!'

A Comparative Summary

Before we conclude, it is useful to include a summary comparing the psychological states of present day Turks and Greeks even though we repeat certain points. Turks and Greeks have certain common characteristics inherited from their 'togetherness'. Their similarities are related to food, music, folklore, traditional architecture, and some common words in their languages which are important but not essential to national identity. Culturally, they are dissimilar because of their different religions and languages. Although they have been 'together' for five hundred years, their histories before and after this togetherness are long and different.

Greeks waged an irregular warfare in order to gain their independence. Greek insurgence consisted of klephts, small local merchants and local priests, local and diaspora elite, as well as European philhellenic liberals. They had many captains in the war but not one nationally recognized, charismatic leader. Except for their Asia Minor campaign (1919-1922), they largely employed irregulars in almost all expansionist undertakings against the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, the Turkish War of Independence was fought and won by an army of regulars under the leadership of an exceptionally charismatic person, an -Ottoman general. He was supported by the nationalist Ottoman elite, almost all of whom were military and civilian bureaucrats.

In the Ottoman Empire, the concept of the state was so overwhelming that the concept of homeland appeared only in the late nineteenth century with the advent of Young Ottomans and the concept of nation in the early part of the twentieth century with the appearance of Young Turks. At its establishment, modem Greece did not inherit a state structure of its own. Earlier, Greeks had identified the concept of state with the despotic Ottoman sultan. Therefore, when they formed a state, right from the beginning, they simply had misgivings about their own state concept. On the other hand, modern Turkey was the inheritor of the Ottoman state.

The above diametrically opposite attitudes of these two neighbors to the concept of the state, the place of the state in their wars of independence, and later in their respective societies, affected their relationships in some ways. The Turks, who associated the respect for state with ethics, morals, discipline, political order, and believed in the seriousness of state-to-state relations mistrusted the Greeks because

they perceived the latter as lacking the same values. In turn, the Greeks, who had associated their irregular spirit with the independent-minded Homeric heroes and the democratic individualism of the West consider the Turks as servile and subservient to the state. They equated the Turkish army which, under the leadership of Mustafa

Kemal, fought and won the war of independence, founded the republic, and played a role in the implementation of reforms, with the Turkish state. For them, the Turkish people, who they feel lack a democratic and individualistic spirit, could not control this expansionist aggressive force which, according to their perception, cruelly invaded Cyprus. Hence, there is a fear of Turkey among the Greeks. The absence of charismatic leadership most likely has prolonged the use of massive projection mechanisms against Turkey. Hellenism was imposed by the West upon the people, who had been cut off from its influence for two millennia. It was transformed into an ideology and became connected with the Megali Idea. It necessitated the denial of the Greeks' existing identity as 'oriental and uncivilized' and its whole projection onto the Turks. The Megali Idea aimed at the liberation of the 'unredeemed brethren' in the old Hellenic territories. This meant irredentism without clearly defined territorial objectives or, perhaps, simply infinite irredentism.

After their war of independence, the Turks also had their nationalistic 'mythology' which was based on the pseudoscientific 'Sun Theory' of language and history. This theory pointed at central Asia, the original home of the Turkic people, as the prehistorically birth place of languages and civilizations from where they spread all over the world. It had nothing to do with irredentism but was an obvious attempt at repairing the self esteem of the Turks who felt humiliated by the defeats during the 'longest century' and the demise of their empire. This 'mythology' never became a national ideology and soon died a natural death.

The main thrust of Kemalist nationalism was to reach the level of contemporary western civilization. This objective had been repeated so often, not only by the leadership but by the rank and file of Atatürk's Republican Party, the press, and the 'enlightened ones' that it has become an integral part of Turkey's political culture. A foreigner who resides in Turkey for some time, gets the impression that the entire society is geared to an elusive objective of catching up with this 'contemporary civilization.'. We can say that Turkey is a country searching for 'utopia'. This search has put the priority of domestic socio-economic development well above foreign policy objectives. As a result, Turkish people have become inward looking, basically indifferent, even insensitive, to outside stimuli, unless they are really disturbed. The security provided by NATO strengthened this isolationistic attitude. The Turks wanted to be left alone with their search for utopia. This was one of the reasons for Turkish loneliness until the mid-1980s.

By contrast, Greeks do not seem to search for a utopia. For example, demands for Greece to become a post-industrial, high technology power never seemed to appear in the usually high sounding rhetoric of Greek political parties. Since Hellenism represents the peak of civilization, there has never been a problem of catching up with 'contemporary civilization'. It would be enough to go back to their old history to become superior to all civilizations.

The opposite traits of these neighbors has complicated their relationships and often confuses third parties. Usually the bigger and stronger party is more enterprising and the other more restrained and withdrawn in string up a conflict. In the Turkish-Greek conflict, it appears that Greece has often taken the initiative; whereas, Turkey has remained defensive. This unusual situation gives the impression that Turkey might be provoking Greece. In spite of its being the smaller of the two, Greece gives the appearance of being forced to shed its fear and choose a heroic path.

Apart from these differences, the two countries resemble each other in that neither of them has yet mourned their past losses and worked through their past hurts. For the Greeks, the loss of the Byzantine Empire and its capital, Constantinople, remain unforgotten. There is resistance to mourn over these losses since it would mean the acceptance of a different identity from that held by modern Greeks. Newer traumas (i.e., the tragedy in Asia Minor in 1922 and the tragedy in Cyprus in 1974) strengthen the Greek feelings of hurt. In this respect, the Greeks seem to have become perennial mourners. This increases the sense of victimization and entitlement, derivatives of which are observed not only with respect to Turkey but also Greece's other Balkan neighbors, in particular Macedonia and Albania. The Turks did not mourn their lost empire either. In this decade, working through the Turkish loss seemed more openly evident, but unless properly managed, it may not be free from complications. Unless Turks and Greeks remove the resistance to mourn their historical losses, they may not adapt themselves to new historical realities.

Assuming Responsibilities

We have noted that issues and elements in the evolution of modern Greek and Turkish identities are not similar. Turkey, with a population of sixty million persons, freed to a great extent from the emotional restrictions of the loneliness' she experienced at the beginning of the Turkish Republic and spurred by the geopolitical changes caused by the Soviet Union's collapse, is attempting to regain its past greatness. The greatness which is searched for is not military but economic and political. In 1992, Turkey possessed Europe's fastest-growing economy. There are, of course, many obstacles against, as well as many good possibilities for, the Turks' aspirations.

For a long time, for practical purposes, Turkey had restricted her vision only to the west. She has now turned to the east (Turkic Republics), to the south (Persian Gulf), and to the north (Russian Federation) with a vigour that is rather new for the Turks.304 Meanwhile, Turkey wants a better relationship with the West, which still remains Turkey's primary partner, and in this regard Greece is perceived as something of an impediment. Meanwhile, Greece is still obsessed with Turkey (and now with the Slavs) and has surpassed Portugal in becoming the poorest nation in the EC. Better neighborly feelings between the Turks and the Greeks could benefit both countries. What is learned about the psychology of Turkish-Greek relationships described in this book might be included in the diplomatic, economic, and legal tools for modifying and enhancing positive outcomes when Turks and Greeks negotiate solutions for their differences.

In the Spring of 1992 and 1993, the authors attended meetings in Kaunas, Lithuania, and Riga, Latvia, where they and other Americans from the University of Virginia's Centre for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction met with interdisciplinary colleagues from Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The aim of these meetings was to study the psychological meaning of the difficulties between the Baltic States and Russia.3os When the Baltic peoples spoke of how they had suffered at the hands of the Russians, the Russians present wanted them to acknowledge that: (1) Russians and Soviets are not the same, and only the latter had been villains; (2) the crimes against the Baltic peoples had been committed not only by Russians but also by their own people; and (3) the Russians themselves had experienced horrors at the hands of the Soviet regime.

The Baltic people responded at first by reminding the Russians that, as far as they were concerned, the Russians were hunted down by their own people, and this, they insisted, was not the same as being hunted down by collaborators working with the intruders. As the meeting progressed, however, some Russian participants expressed profound understanding that one group cannot escape its own heritage, and that they would assume responsibility for what the previous generation in Russia had done to the Baltic nations. After that acknowledgment, the participants, regardless of national origin, could listen to one another with greater empathy.

Like the Russians under the Soviets who were linked to other ethnic groups, the Muslim Turkish communities under the Ottomans shared a similar fate with the Greek communities. This 'togetherness' has too often escaped the consciousness of Western observers of the Ottoman scene. Within the Ottoman Empire and modem Turkey, the Turks were, and are, in a dilemma similar to the one faced by the Russian participants in the aforementioned Kaunas and Riga meetings. The Turks constituted only one of the ethnic groups within the empire, but like the Russians, the heirs of the Soviets, the Turks are of the same 'stuff as the Ottomans. This is so integral a part of their past identity that they cannot select what is 'good' from their heritage and deny and disregard what is 'bad'.

Meanwhile, a responsibility falls on the Greeks' shoulders. Modern Greece has existed for over one hundred and seventy years, one hundred years longer than the existence of modern Turkey. Turkokratia can no longer, logically speaking, be blamed for Greece's difficulties, especially regarding the area of their economy. Farmers and shepherds constitute nearly a quarter of Greece's population, and Greece lags behind Europe on standards of modernization. As Turkey attracts more western investment, Greece experiences a sense of betrayal by the western countries. It seems to us that the continuation of the unconscious sense of victimization combined with the conscious idealization of Hellenism might be the underlying factors for the Greeks' obsession with the Turks (Chapter 15). Vast energy is spent to gratify the psychological needs of the group (i.e., extensive military expenditures), and this obsession has been costly for Greece. Turkey and Greece will be better neighbors if all join in singing Eartha Kitt's song, 'Istanbul, not Constantinople'. After all, this has been the reality since 1453.

[TurkishForum note: Alternative music lovers can also listen They Might Be Giants version of "Istanbul, not Constantinople" version as well.]